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Abstract
The Socio-Economic Segregation in European Capital Cities: East Meets West 
project investigates changing levels of socio-economic segregation in 13 major 
European cities: Amsterdam, Budapest, Vienna, Stockholm, Oslo, London, Vilnius, 
Tallinn, Prague, Madrid, Milan, Athens and Riga. The two main conclusions of this 
major study are that the levels of socio-economic segregation in European cities 
are still relatively modest compared to some other parts of the world but that the 
spatial gap between poor and rich is widening in all capital cities across Europe. 
Segregation levels in the East of Europe started at a lower level compared to the 
West of Europe, but the East is quickly catching up, although there are large dif-
ferences between cities. Four central factors were found to play a major role in the 
changing urban landscape in Europe: welfare and housing regimes, globalisation 
and economic restructuring, rising economic inequality and historical development 
paths. Where state intervention in Europe has long countered segregation, (neo) 
liberal transformations in welfare states, under the influence of globalisation, have 
caused an increase in inequality. As a result, the levels of socio-economic segrega-
tion are moving upwards. If this trend were to continue, Europe would be at risk 
of slipping into the epoch of growing inequalities and segregation where the rich 
and the poor will live separate lives in separate parts of their cities, which could 
seriously harm the social stability of our future cities.
Introduction
The spatial sorting of residents according to socio-economic status is as old as the 
history of urbanisation (Nightingale 2012). Processes and patterns of segregation 
are far from uniform in historical and regional contexts (York et al. 2012). The 
intensity and geography of socio-spatial divisions in cities are related to the con-
stant interplay between institutions that set the rules of the game and households 
that make residential location decisions. Most important, unlike other forms of 
segregation, such as those based on race, ethnicity or religion, socio-economic 
segregation is usually seen as a direct effect of economic inequality. Common 
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sense may suggest that greater inequality in a city also entails higher levels of 
socio-economic segregation (Reardon and Bischoff 2011). Nonetheless, more 
often than not, the relation between the two is far from ‘positive’ and ‘linear’. 
The seemingly obvious and logical regularity of this relation is mediated by a 
country/region-specific institutional setting and a city’s trajectory of economic 
and population development (Burgers and Musterd 2002; Maloutas and Fujita 
2012; Musterd and Ostendorf 1998). Moreover, socio-economic segregation will 
also be mediated by other forms of segregation, such as race-based and ethnic 
segregation (van Ham and Manley 2009; Manley and van Ham 2011). When a 
household ‘selects’ a certain place to live on demographic or cultural grounds, 
there will also be an impact on segregation in socio-economic terms. Viewed in 
this light, the studies on class-based spatial divisions in a selection of European 
cities brought together in this volume illuminate the complex relations between 
economic inequality, social disparities, and urban space. These relations unfold 
in the divergent historical, demographic, cultural and institutional contexts of 
the northern, southern, western and eastern parts of Europe at times of profound 
political and economic changes. Sweeping across the continent in the last two 
decades, these changes include the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and demise of 
the Soviet Union (1991), the enlargement of the European Union to include the 
new member states from East Europe1 in 2004 and 2007, a concomitant massive 
East–West migration and, more recently, a deep economic crisis and its aftermath.
After an era of decreasing social inequality, which effectively started after 
World War II, from the early 1970s onwards, income inequality has been con-
tinuously increasing across the globe. In Europe, wealth inequalities are currently 
almost as high as they used to be in the heydays of laissez-faire capitalism in the 
late nineteenth century (Piketty 2013). Interestingly, one and a half centuries ago, 
similar levels of inequality were related to the formation of dreadful slums (Booth 
1887, 1888; Engels 1892) and to clear-cut spatial divisions between the rich and 
the poor in the great industrial cities of that epoch (Park et al. 1925; Zorbaugh 
1929). In the early 1990s, when globalisation was thriving and a new global divi-
sion of labour evolved, some scholars predicted similar scenarios for urban areas 
at the turn of the twenty-first century. In brief, the end of the second and the begin-
ning of the third millennium were heralded to be the advent of the era of mounting 
inequality, increasing class segregation and concentrated affluence and poverty 
(Massey 1996). 
While there are several European studies of ethnic/racial segregation (Arbaci 
2007; Huttman et al. 1991; Malheiros 2002; Musterd et al. 1998), European com-
parative research on class- or income-based socio-spatial divisions has received 
much less scholarly attention in the last 30 years. Although there are studies compar-
ing European cities in the spheres of social inequality (for example Musterd 2005; 
Musterd and van Kempen 2007), these are rather crude, or limited to certain seg-
ments of a city, such as post-war neighbourhoods. Diligent up-to-date research on 
socio-economic (income or class) segregation in more than one city is hard to find. 
There are exceptions though, and some studies are dealing with socio-economic 
segregation in North America (Fischer et al. 2004; Reardon and Bischoff 2011; 
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Watson 2009), in West Europe and other western countries (Maloutas and Fuijta 
2012; Musterd and Ostendorf 1998) or, recently, also in East Europe (Marcińczak 
et al. 2015). The contributions from 13 major European cities collected in this 
volume – Amsterdam, Budapest, Vienna, Stockholm, Oslo, London, Vilnius, Tallinn, 
Prague, Madrid, Milan, Athens and Riga – reveal that the levels of socio-economic 
segregation are moving upwards, and that the spatial gap between the more extreme 
socio-economic categories is widening in all capital cities across Europe.
The lack of studies that compare and contrast processes and patterns of socio-
economic segregation is in fact surprising as the field of urban studies is currently 
witnessing a revival and a reorientation of comparative research (McFarlane and 
Robinson 2012; Robinson 2011; Ward 2010). Essentially, this reinvigorated strand 
of urban studies aims at the systematic study of similarity and difference among 
cities or urban processes both through description and explanation (Nijman 2007). 
Even if the chances for a methodologically rigorous case selection are fairly 
slim (Kantor and Savitch 2005; McFarlane 2010; Pickvance 1986), comparative 
urbanism emphasises the merit of a cyclical movement between theorising and 
doing empirical research. This offers a unique opportunity to review established 
theories and to avoid further development of decontextualised universalist ideas 
and models of urban development (Robinson 2011).
In this final chapter an attempt is made to draw some general conclusions from 
comparing the findings from all the studies that were presented in this volume. 
Before doing that, however, we have to point out two caveats related to the cross-
case comparisons we present. First, the very idea of ‘a city’ is not the same in 
every European country. The proposed definition of the city was a continuous 
built-up area (Tammaru et al. 2016b). Some contributors collected and analysed 
data for urban regions (metropolitan areas), while others had to limit their analy-
sis to areas within administrative boundaries of the city, and still others did both. 
These choices partly reflect data availability and partly also the urban processes 
themselves, for example the extent of urban sprawl. This inconsistency, which 
is also present in previous comparative studies on segregation in Europe, may 
potentially bias direct comparisons, as tighter delimitations, arguably, conceal the 
effects of intraregional population dynamics that shape patterns of segregation, for 
example. suburbanisation. The second caveat relates to the fact that availability of 
data reflecting (socio) economic disparities varies from country to country, even 
when looking at relatively similar European countries, and impacts not only on 
the definition of the city but also the choice of socio-economic indicators. Because 
of this, contributors relied on the division of population into income groups, or 
classifications of socio-professional status or highest education completed. The 
latter two are imperfect proxies for income disparities, while a distinction on the 
basis of income falls short in covering the whole spectrum of social inequality 
as well. Finally, we decided to exclude Milan from direct comparisons with the 
other cities. The reason we did this is that the results from Milan pertain to the last 
decade of the twentieth century, while the focus of this chapter is on the evolving 
patterns of socio-economic segregation in the new millennium. However, we take 
on board the upshot of the Italian study. 
Lessons from a pan-European comparative study 361
The rest of this chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section 
summarises the changing patterns of socio-economic segregation in political and/
or economic capital cities of Europe in the first decade of the new millennium. 
In the introductory chapter of the book (Tammaru et al. 2016b) we presented a 
multi-factor approach to understanding segregation that resulted in the following 
theoretical ranking of cities with regard to their expected level of socio-economic 
segregation: London; Riga; Madrid and Vilnius; Milan and Tallinn; Amsterdam 
and Athens; Budapest, Oslo and Stockholm; and finally Prague and Vienna. The 
case studies presented in this book revealed a somewhat different ranking based 
on real data: Madrid and Milan; Tallinn; London; Stockholm; Vienna; Athens; 
Amsterdam; Budapest; Riga; Vilnius; Prague; and Oslo. In this concluding chap-
ter we will elaborate on the differences between the theoretical and actual rankings 
of cities, mainly by scrutinising the similarities and differences in the levels and 
geographies of class-based spatial-disparities in our case cities. In the following 
section we elucidate how globalisation, economic inequality, different housing 
regimes and forms of welfare state relate to patterns of socio-spatial divisions in 
our selection of European cities. In the third and concluding section, we summa-
rise the most important findings in the perspective of the multi-factor approach we 
developed in the introductory chapter of this volume.
Class and space in the European city
More than 50 years ago, Chicago scholars found that spatial distance grows with 
social distance and that a truncated U-shape characterises segregation profiles. 
Both high and low social categories appeared to be highly segregated, but higher 
social categories were consistently more segregated than lower social groups 
in the American city (Duncan and Duncan 1955). This was later confirmed in 
Europe by studies from England and Wales (Morgan 1975, 1980). The skewed 
U-shape of segregation profiles toward higher socio-economic groups also 
applied to the European cities that were developing under totalitarian socialist 
regimes (Dangschat 1987; Ladányi 1989; Szelényi 1987). Interestingly, it seems 
that the trend found and confirmed in different Fordist societies did not vanish 
with the end of Fordism; the profile still holds in the United States in the 2000s 
(Fischer et al. 2004; Reardon and Bischoff 2011). Yet, how persistent is the trun-
cated pattern of socio-spatial divisions in Europe? Segregation outcomes from 
12 European cities presented in this volume cast some doubt on the seemingly 
universal shape of relations between class and space. We used the index of seg-
regation (IS) as a measure that summarises residential separation of one group 
from the remainder of the population. The IS illustrates the degree to which 
class-based disparities correlate with spatial distance. The indices of segrega-
tion for top and bottom social categories refer to the two ends of the segregation 
U-curve (Figure 15.1); the cities were ordered by the decreasing degree of resi-
dential separation of the highest socio-economic category in the early 2000s. 
The results presented in Figure 15.1, but also in other figures in this chapter, 
should be interpreted with care. The different variables used to distinguish the 
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top (high) and bottom (low) social categories, as well as different spatial units, 
may influence the values of segregation measures. Notwithstanding the limi-
tations of available data, it is clear that the rule that higher classes are more 
segregated than the lower classes is not ubiquitous. Even if in two-thirds of 12 
European capital cities, the higher class is the most segregated social category 
(in Amsterdam, Stockholm, Oslo, Vienna, Madrid, Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius), the 
remaining cases show other outcomes. In Athens2 and London, a counterintuitive 
segregation profile has been present for the last two decades. The ‘anomaly’ has 
been fading out in Budapest, but it has become a clear pattern in Prague. We must 
take into account that these differences between cases may be an effect of scale: 
the use of either cities or the whole metropolitan area. Essentially, metropolitan 
areas represent a spatial scale that allows more variation within its boundaries 
than a city does, for example concentrations of the affluent in inner London and 
more dispersed concentrations elsewhere in greater London can exist simultane-
ously. The stronger segregation of lower social groups could also result from 
inherited morphological structure and housing inequalities. But maybe also 
suburbanisation draws higher social echelons out of previously socially mixed 
neighbourhoods, as seems to be the case in Budapest and Prague. In other words, 
irrespective of the apparently unifying effect of neo-liberalisation and globalisa-
tion, the institutional, economic and demographic contexts still play a key role 
in determining which end of the social hierarchy is more segregated. The general 
conclusion about the shape of the distribution of segregation by social category 
is that profiles reported in 12 cities are skewed and that in most but not all cases, 
the highest social strata appear to be the most segregated.
Figure 15.1 Index of segregation scores for top and bottom social categories.
Notes: * Metropolitan region, **city
Madrid, Tallinn, London, Budapest, Vilnius, Athens, Prague, Riga – managers and elementary 
occupations.
Amsterdam, Oslo, Stockholm – highest and lowest income quintile.
Vienna – university degree and compulsory education.
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Figure 15.1 shows index of segregation scores for top and bottom social 
categories for 12 cities for both 2001 and 2011. There is a substantial difference 
between the levels of socio-economic segregation in our European case cities. 
In general, whereas in the early 2000s it was still possible to argue that West 
European cities were more segregated than those in the East, a decade later this is 
no longer so obvious. Most importantly, the intensity of socio-spatial divisions and 
its changes have not followed any clear regional pattern (Figure 15.1). The levels 
of segregation of the top and of the bottom categories decreased in Amsterdam 
(but see below). In Vienna and Prague (limited) desegregation was confined to 
the top social categories only, but we should take into account that the segregation 
level of the top social class in Vienna was already very high in 2001. In London 
and Budapest only the lower social groups became more evenly distributed; here 
we notice that segregation levels of the lowest class in London were already 
very high in 2001. Socio-economic spatial divisions of the social ‘top’ (relative 
to the rest) and ‘bottom’ (relative to the rest) became more pronounced in the 
other seven cities (Stockholm, Oslo, Madrid, Athens, Tallinn, Vilnius and Riga). 
The rise of segregation was especially high in Stockholm, Tallinn and Madrid. 
Interestingly, the recent crisis seems to contribute to both increasing segregation 
(Madrid) and desegregation (Amsterdam). In the latter case, the crisis implied a 
dynamic that was against the processes that were going on before and that created 
more segregation. Due to the crisis, people did not dare to make big (residential) 
decisions anymore; this resulted in (likely temporary) reduced segregation levels. 
In addition, there were swift changes in the formerly nineteenth-century neigh-
bourhoods in Amsterdam that created – temporarily – more mix. Therefore, in 
a more structural sense segregation also seems to be increasing in Amsterdam. 
However, segregation also increased in Madrid also during the crisis. Here it 
seems that the crisis strengthened the segregation processes that were already 
ongoing: the poor became poorer in the neighbourhoods where they already lived; 
and the rich were able to retain their wealth, largely because the higher managerial 
and professional ranks managed to cope with the effects of the crisis. Moreover, 
Madrid only recently started to weaken the impact of family solidarity networks, 
networks requiring spatial proximity between different social classes and gen-
erations (Allen et al. 2004), implying that segregation could increase due to that 
process too. Also, gentrification started late in Madrid, and therefore the initial 
desegregating effects, which usually can be seen in the early phases of gentrifica-
tion (cf. Freeman 2009; Galster and Booza 2007), are still negligible. Overall, for 
9 of the 12 cities we had information on, we find increasing levels of segregation 
of the top social categories; and also for 9 of the 12 cities we found increasing 
segregation of the lowest social categories. Amsterdam may perhaps be added to 
these latter 9.
All in all, the main empirical finding of this comparative research is that socio-
economic segregation levels increased in European capital cities between the 2001 
and 2011. In those cases where desegregation occurred, this seems to be due to a 
lack of opportunities, economic uncertainty due to crises (Amsterdam) or simply 
because of the spatial distribution of affordable housing (Athens in the 1990s). In 
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Milan scholars point at demographic processes that are driving declining segregation: 
(1) gentrification leading to the substitution of working-class households in 
working-class neighbourhoods by white-collar workers; (2) under right-to-buy 
schemes working-class households purchased properties which they subsequently 
sold to white-collar households; (3) upgrading through inheritance, where a white-
collar children inherit a house from their working-class parents; (4) the tendency 
for self-employed households on modest incomes to settle in the working-class 
periphery of the city where housing is affordable and where public and state-subsidised 
housing is mainly located. In other words, it seems that there are two general 
factors that appear to reduce levels of segregation, possibly both only temporarily. 
One is a limited or reduced level of residential mobility that leads to in situ social 
mobility: sitting residents become richer or poorer in their neighbourhoods. That 
creates more mix in situ and thus lower levels of segregation (cf. Galster and Booza 
2007). When residential mobility increases again, we should see rising levels of 
segregation. The second factor is gentrification. Especially when gentrification 
is new in an area, this is typically a process where formerly homogeneous low-
income households become accompanied by socially upward neighbours. This will 
initially reduce the level of segregation. More mature gentrification may again 
result in increasing segregation.
It would be misleading to attribute all changing levels of segregation to the 
effects of the crises and/or demographic processes only; these forces will be 
responsible for temporal deviations of the more general and structural changes 
in some cities, but not in all. The mounting socio-economic spatial disparities in 
Tallinn, a city that has also been in the grip of the recent economic crisis, may well 
have other roots. It is likely that the significantly higher levels of socio-spatial 
divisions in Tallinn in 2010 stem from the realised potential of the rapidly grow-
ing income inequality and employment change in the 1990s. Segregation has been 
on the rise in most of the other East European cities too. Essentially, while eco-
nomic disparity skyrocketed throughout the region, the patterns of segregation did 
not change much in East Europe in the first decade after the collapse of socialism 
(Marcińczak et al. 2013, 2014; Sýkora 2009). However, from the second decade 
onwards, inequalities started materialising in space. Finally, institutional arrange-
ments, housing regimes and the extent of the welfare state have had a tremendous 
impact on socio-economic segregation. In countries that virtually did not suffer 
from economic turmoil, levels of segregation either decreased somewhat (higher 
social strata in Vienna), or, as the case of Stockholm clearly exemplifies, increas-
ing segregation could be observed before and after the crises. We will discuss 
the nexus between institutional arrangements, economic inequality and socio-
economic segregation in the next section.
Figure 15.2 shows indices of dissimilarity between opposite social groups 
that gives a more coherent picture of changing levels of socio-economic segrega-
tion in Europe. Essentially, despite visible signs of desegregation of the top and/
or the bottom social groups, residential separation of the rich from the poor has 
been consistently growing over the last decade in all cases included in our study, 
except for Amsterdam (Figure 15.2). However, if we leave out the effect of the 
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economic and housing crisis, which hit Amsterdam particularly hard, the separa-
tion between the rich and the poor also increased in Amsterdam, as shown in this 
volume. The reduced levels of segregation of the ‘top’ relative to the rest, or the 
‘bottom’ relative to the rest (reported above for some cities), does not prevent 
increasing separation of the ‘top’ from the ‘bottom’. This indicates that although 
socio-economic residential mixing may occur, this is limited to groups with a 
status that is not too far apart from each other. This corroborates the findings by 
Musterd et al. (2014), who showed that the tendency to move increases with the 
social distance between an individual and the social level of the neighbourhood 
(s)he is living in; larger social distances imply a larger propensity to move and 
subsequently a larger chance to end up in a socially more similar neighbourhood. 
However, the spatial gap between the more extreme categories, those that ‘have’ 
and those that ‘have not’ is pretty much widening all over Europe. However, so 
far, the socio-economic segregation is clearly lower than in the USA (Florida 
2014) or in Brazil (Villaca 2011).
The ethnic and socio-economic dimensions of segregation are often 
linked. Even if the two dimensions do not overlap completely, immigrants in 
the West European countries, especially those newly arrived, are frequently 
overrepresented among the urban poor (Arbaci 2007). Yet, there is also class 
differentiation within categories of native and non-native residents. Some cities 
(Amsterdam, Stockholm) show that such class differentiation is even bigger for 
some non-native categories than for the native categories. Strong social divisions 
underpinned by ethnic disparities do not necessarily have to be a consequence 
of recent immigration. The Baltic States, principally Estonia, demonstrate the 
effect of deeply rooted ethnic divisions amplified by the downfall of social-
ism and the formation of independent statehood in the early 1990s. In Tallinn, 
the divisions between higher-class natives and lower-class minority groups are 
higher than in any other European city where ethnic divisions are present; such 
Figure 15.2 Index of dissimilarity.
Notes: * Metropolitan region, **city
Madrid, Tallinn, London, Budapest, Vilnius, Athens, Prague, Riga – managers and elementary occupations.
Amsterdam, Oslo, Stockholm – highest and lowest income quintile.
Vienna – university degree and compulsory education.
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a scale of disparities, arguably, evokes the picture of clear-cut ethnic/racial divi-
sions epitomised by urban regions in the USA (Farley et al. 1978; van Kempen 
and Murie 2009). 
Table 15.1 gives an insight into the major areas of concentration for top and 
bottom social groups in 12 cities. The descriptions in the table and the figures 
show that the geography of socio-economic segregation in European cities does 
not follow a uniform model. The only general characteristic shared by all 13 cit-
ies was a mosaic socio-spatial structure of the urban fabric. In the last 10 years 
this inherent feature of socio-economic spatial divisions in the European city 
(French and Hamilton 1979; Marcińczak et al. 2015; Musterd 2005) has some-
what changed. In the first decade of the twenty-first century we can now see 
emerging a more regular, often sectorial, pattern of socio-economic segregation 
in many cities. In short, the seemingly mosaic pattern of social disparities con-
ceals divergent, context-sensitive, local patterns of class segregation (Table 15.1). 
In cities like Stockholm, London and Amsterdam, urban-oriented fractions of 
the middle class and certain professions increasingly concentrate in the central 
parts of the metropolitan area and the poorer households are consistently more 
dependent on housing in more peripheral residential areas. Social mix and anti-
segregation policies may have reduced this process but failed to stop the overall 
trend. Interestingly, London is an excellent example of how persistent the legacy 
of historically developed segregation patterns might be: the social status of some 
neighbourhoods has not changed much for more than a century (Manley and 
Johnston 2015). The geographies of class divisions in Budapest and Vienna also 
point towards an important role for an ‘inherited’ urban fabric. Even though the 
two cities developed in radically different economic and political milieus in the 
second half of the twentieth century, higher social categories still occupy bour-
geois tenements and villas, and lower classes are overrepresented in poor-quality 
buildings that housed the working class in the last days of the Habsburg Empire.
In Athens, more affluent sections of the population occupied specific subur-
ban territory. This is a somewhat reverse image compared with West Europe. In 
Athens this was due to a stable professional structure, stable housing markets, 
limited residential mobility, reduced immigration and vertical segregation. A sim-
ilar reversed pattern with elite in the suburbs and poorer households in the central 
districts can be found in Madrid, although independent professionals slowly seem 
to be ‘taking over’ the central parts of town as well. The effects of suburbanisa-
tion, a major trend in regional population dynamics after socialism (Stanilov and 
Sýkora 2014), on patterns of segregation are also clearly visible in East Europe. 
Top social groups have been incrementally moving to the peripheral and suburban 
estates where new housing was available. On the other hand, in five post-socialist 
cities, top social echelons are overrepresented in the inner-city too. Assuming that 
gentrification gained momentum in the 2000s (Kovács et al. 2013), and that large 
socialist-era residential estates, often the dominant form of housing, have been 
consistently losing the better-off residents, more clear-cut spatial divisions might 
actually materialise in East Europe in the future. However, new geographies of 
segregation might not necessarily be similar to elsewhere in Europe.
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Economic disparities, globalisation, institutions and 
segregation
The starting point for this study was the multi-factor approach which we presented 
in the introduction of this volume (Tammaru et al. 2016b). This approach resulted 
in a theoretical ranking of our case study cities by the level of socio-economic 
segregation. Referring to theories explaining patterns of socio-economic seg-
regation, the multi-factor approach lists a number of ‘universal’ and ‘relative’ 
characteristics determining levels and geographies of social divisions. The 
‘universal’ factors are believed to cause ubiquitous effects that are not sensitive 
to spatio-temporal parameters, whereas the ‘relative’ factors are highly specific 
to particular social systems (Pickvance 1986). As a more parsimonious approach 
might still be beneficial for meaningful comparative analysis (Kantor and 
Savitch 2005), we selected four key variables for further examination. Essentially, 
we chose two universal factors (income inequality and level of globalisation) 
and two contextual factors (housing regimes and forms of the welfare state) to 
elucidate the complex relations between important structural economic and insti-
tutional changes and evolving patterns of residential segregation we encounter in 
European cities. We present a series of bivariate analyses of the relations between 
spatial separation of opposing social groups and the key contributory factors.
In general, it is taken for granted that socio-economic segregation is a product 
of socio-economic inequality, and that growing inequality results in increasing 
segregation (Massey 1996; van Kempen 2007; Watson 2009). However, the appar-
ently universal and strong correlation between social and spatial divisions is not 
always existing (Fuijta 2012). In brief, the catalysing effect of income inequality 
on residential segregation hinges on context-specific institutional arrangements: 
for instance, a close and lasting link between segregation and inequality requires 
the presence of an income-based housing market and housing policies that relate 
income to residential location (Brown and Chung 2008; Reardon and Bischoff 
2011). The results from the analysis of our 13 European cities shed some new 
light on these relations.
As in many other developed and developing countries across the globe (Stiglitz 
2013), income inequality has been on the rise in most of Europe. In the last dec-
ade, societies became more equal income-wise in Estonia, and to a lesser extent 
in Norway and the Netherlands. Bearing in mind that generally the levels of 
socio-economic segregation also went up, it is tempting to suggest that the two 
phenomena are tightly linked. Figure 15.3 shows the relationship between income 
inequality (Gini index) and the level of residential segregation between top and 
bottom social categories measured by the index of dissimilarity. Indeed, in 11 
out of 12 European cities the changing intensity of segregation reflects changes 
in income inequality; growing inequality involves increasing segregation, and, 
as the case of Amsterdam clearly illustrates, reduced levels of segregation follow 
income disparities (Figure 15.3). Nonetheless, it seems that segregation may 
surge irrespective of reducing economic inequality; in Tallinn, but also in Oslo, 
such a paradoxical situation is unambiguous. In both countries income inequality 
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was consistently growing in the 1990s that may actually point to the lagged effect 
of income disparities on residential segregation; it simply takes time before spa-
tial patterns catch up with socio-economic changes. Interestingly, a temporarily 
reversed relationship between economic inequality and segregation is also pos-
sible; in East Europe, rapidly growing income disparities after the collapse of 
socialism entailed short-term desegregation in the 1990s (Marcińczak et al. 2013: 
2014; Sýkora 2009). A fairly similar trend could also be found outside former 
socialist Europe (Oslo in the last decade of the previous century). In fact, such a 
long-term perspective on the relation between social inequality and the level of 
socio-spatial segregation also proves to be more relevant for almost all of the cities 
included in this study. In that respect it is also important to filter out the temporary 
or conjunctural effects. With a view on social inequality over a longer period of 
time, we can show, for example, that Amsterdam (and the Netherlands) experi-
enced substantially growing inequality over the past three decades, which also 
resulted in increasing socio-spatial segregation until 2008 when the crisis started. 
In 2011, compared to the start of the millennium, social inequality dropped 
a little, but compared to the late 1980s social inequality rose significantly. The 
more recent drop coincided with lower levels of segregation, which were also to 
be ascribed to the crisis. If crisis effects are left out, economic inequality has been 
on the rise for the last two or three decades. 
Figure 15.3  Income inequality and residential segregation between top and bottom social 
categories in selected European cities, 2001/2004–2011.
Notes: * Metropolitan region, **city.
Madrid, Tallinn, London, Budapest, Vilnius, Athens, Prague, Riga – managers and elementary occupations.
Amsterdam, Oslo, Stockholm – highest and lowest income quintile.
Vienna – university degree and compulsory education.
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Even if the widening spatial gap between the top social class and the bottom 
social class generally correlates with a growing economic inequality, as can be 
shown for 9 out of 12 cities, it does not necessarily mean that the most unequal 
cities are also the most segregated. Stockholm, the capital of one of the most equal 
countries in the world, is – at the moment – relatively high in the hierarchy of 
socio-economic segregation in Europe. Most important, the relationship between 
segregation and inequality is rarely linear. In other words, a relatively small increase 
in income inequality may relate to significantly growing residential segregation 
(Madrid, Stockholm). On the other hand, a more substantial growth of socio-
economic disparities may well coincide with a negligible increase in residential 
segregation (Budapest, Prague). Thus, social inequality is not sufficient as the sole 
explanatory factor of the evolving patterns of residential segregation in Europe. 
The globalisation of the economy and society and a series of massive and par-
allel changes that the processes involve, have been argued to stimulate the growth 
of socio-economic disparities and segregation in the contemporary city (Fainstein 
et al. 1992, Marcuse and van Kempen 2002; Massey 1996; Smith 2002). The evo-
lution of the employment structure in major hubs and nodes in the global spaces 
of flows of money and people, amplified by a post-Fordist restructuring of the 
economy, may indeed lead to social and occupational polarisation (Sassen 1991). 
Essentially, the dwindling labour-intensive manufacturing industry in much of 
Europe and North America, in the aftermath of the new global division of labour 
(Massey 1995), has led to new economic activities that demand new types of 
labour, many of them with higher levels of education. Some cities will manage 
(or already have managed) to deliver the required new types of employees more 
easily than others. As Burgers and Musterd (2002) have set out, cities with a 
very strong history as a manufacturing industry centre, which were dependent on 
low-skilled or unskilled employees, may not immediately succeed in profession-
alising their population – transforming their professional structures to the newly 
required standards. In those cases a certain mismatch may develop between the 
demand for labour and the supply of it. This will result in rising unemployment 
levels in those cities, especially for the lower-skilled people. In contrast, cities 
that already had a profile in which service-sector jobs were more important and 
which were well-connected to important city networks, may have created a better 
position to fit the new economic requirements. These will be characterised by an 
easier expansion of activities in (international) services and knowledge-intensive 
industry sectors and are able to provide the correct skilled labour, and thus experi-
ence fewer mismatches and less unemployment. Some of the cities may, due to 
their connectedness and professional structure, become well positioned to connect 
with other major cities in the world and become essential nodes, or even centres 
of control in new economic networks. In truly global cities with such node or 
control functions, the rapid development of the service sector will involve the 
development of a large number of well-paid jobs in high-end producer services 
but also strong growth of low-paid, often dead-end, jobs associated with serving 
the better-off. The city type that will develop in such circumstances will typically 
be the polarised city Sassen (1991) was referring to.
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In short, the future of cities is partly conditioned by the historically created eco-
nomic profile of the city and the level of integration in the global economy. This 
may or may not lead to increasing social disparities, mismatches, social polarisa-
tion or duality (Castells 1989). Yet, even cities that manage to get a strong position 
in global networks will not automatically become the most segregated cities 
(Butler and Hamnett 2012); logically, actual social and spatial divisions are highly 
complex (Marcuse 1989; Hamnett 2012). Nevertheless, for some cities, globalisa-
tion brought about growing socio-economic inequalities (van Kempen 2007) and, 
at least in the USA, also more intensive spatial segregation (Fischer et al. 2004; 
Reardon and Bischoff 2011). In other cities existing economic structures did not 
suit the globalisation processes. This may have resulted in mismatches between 
demand and supply of labour, but may also have triggered active professionali-
sation policies, increasing professional skills throughout the social distribution, 
therewith reducing the share of lower strata while increasing the middle and upper 
strata. According to many, professionalisation, not polarisation, has in fact been 
the main trend in the transformations of employment profiles in European cities. 
The pattern that was clear in Europe already in the 1980s (Hamnett 1994), and 
that seems to have become even more prominent in the 1990s (Butler et al. 2008; 
Maloutas and Fujita 2012; Marcińczak et al. 2014, 2015; Préteceille 2000), may 
not have changed too much in the first decade of the new millennium, although 
there is difference between cities. In short, we expect a relationship between the 
‘global’ character of a city and the level of social polarisation that will also be 
reflected in spatial segregation between top and bottom, but that relationship can 
be mitigated by a range of other forces.
It is hard to quantify such a multidimensional phenomenon as globalisation. 
We refer to a well-known typology of cities that reflects a city’s connection with 
the global economy (Beaverstock et al. 2014) to differentiate between European 
cities that are more embedded in the space of flows and those that are less. There 
are three groups and several subcategories of world cities: Alpha cities link major 
economic regions and states to the world economy; Beta cities link their region or 
state to the world economy; and Gamma cities connect smaller regions or states to 
the world economy (Beaverstock et al. 2015) Figure 15.4 shows the relationship 
between world-city status and residential segregation between top and bottom 
social groups. 
The European cities examined in this study virtually represent all categories 
distinguished by the world-cities taxonomy; major European urban areas range 
from the iconic Alpha++ global cities like London to the much-less integrated 
capital cities of the Baltic States. Then, what do we see when we relate the clas-
sification based on this indicator of globalisation with the level of segregation of 
the cities studied in this volume? And how does that relation change over time?
It can be shown that in 2011 the paradigmatic global city, London, is not the 
most segregated in Europe anymore; in fact, it is clearly less divided than Madrid 
(Alpha), but also less than Tallinn, a Gamma city. This is in concordance with 
what we see in the United States where the most globalised cities (New York, 
Los Angeles or Chicago) are not among the top ten most segregated metropolitan 
372 Szymon Marcińczak et al.
areas (Florida 2014). However, we also see that Tallinn is, in fact, an outlier when 
it comes to the relation between globalisation and segregation. It used to be mod-
erately socio-economically segregated like other East European cities but became 
highly ethno-linguistically segregated under socialism (Marcińczak et al. 2015; 
Tammaru and Kontuly 20101). What has happened in Estonia over the past two 
decades is a growing overlap between ethnic and socio-economic segregation, 
driven by marked occupational differences between the members of the minor-
ity and majority population in very market-driven social and housing contexts 
that may easily translate income differences into spatial differences (Tammaru 
et al. 2016a). Apart from Tallinn, there appears to be a firm relation between the 
‘global’ position and the level of segregation between the ‘top’ and the ‘bottom’ of 
the social distribution (Figure 15.4). Lower levels of segregation go along with a 
more moderate position in global networks, while higher levels of segregation go 
together with a stronger position in global networks. The relation almost remains 
the same in terms of the strength (in fact it becomes slightly stronger) but was 
systematically at a higher level in 2011 compared to 2001. In short, there (still) is 
a firm relationship between globalisation and segregation.
Next to the dimensions we referred to so far – social inequality and globali-
sation – there are two context-sensitive dimensions that relate to the extent of 
welfare provision, indicating a type of welfare state, and the characteristics of 
Figure 15.4  World city status and residential segregation between top and bottom social 
groups in selected European cities.
Notes: * Metropolitan region, **city.
Madrid, Tallinn, London, Budapest, Vilnius, Athens, Prague, Riga – managers and elementary 
occupations.
Amsterdam, Oslo, Stockholm – highest and lowest income quintile.
Vienna – university degree and compulsory education.
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housing regimes. The forms of housing provision and the degree of housing com-
modification are tightly linked to the type of welfare state, and both phenomena 
play a part in shaping levels of socio-economic and ethnic segregation (Arbaci 
2007; Musterd and Ostendorf 1998). To further expose the contingent roots of 
the changing patterns of socio-economic segregation in Europe, we have adopted 
the well-known typology of welfare states proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990) 
along with its extensions to south Europe (Allen et al. 2004) and to the former 
socialist countries (Fenger 2007). Consequently, we distinguish between six types 
of European welfare regimes: democratic, corporatist, corporatist south European, 
corporatist post-socialist, liberal and liberal post-socialist. The former studies 
on ethnic divisions in Europe revealed that the liberal welfare-state correlates 
with evidently higher levels of segregation, while the corporatist and democratic 
welfare models are related to the lower scale of spatial disparities (Musterd and 
Ostendorf 1998).
With regard to housing regimes, an important element of the welfare state, 
we refer to Kemeny’s (2002) general division between unitary and dual housing 
regimes that reflects the degree of government’s direct (unitary) and indirect (dual) 
involvement in housing provision, regulations and subsidies. As this classification 
is somewhat crude, we are sensitive to regional variations of the two ideal types. 
Consequently, we also distinguish between the south European (Mediterranean) 
housing system (Allen et al. 2004) and the post-socialist variants of unitary and 
dual models. The Mediterranean and unitary housing regimes, especially when 
accompanied by different subtypes of the corporatist welfare-model, have been 
argued to result in lower levels of segregation than more market-oriented dual 
housing regimes (Arbaci 2007). It also seems that lower-income households in 
unitary regimes live in relatively better neighbourhoods compared with their 
counterparts in different forms of the dual regimes (Norris and Winston 2012). 
The results from the 13 European cities we included in this volume show that 
globalisation and post-Fordist economic restructuring contribute to the legible 
retrenchment of the welfare state in the new millennium (Figure 15.5).
Neo-liberalising states have tremendous impacts on urban housing markets. 
Urban economic restructuring, reduced welfare state interventions in several 
domains of life and high international in-migration (in many cities) have firmly 
affected structural changes over the past decades. Still, there is an enormous dif-
ference between state provisions within Europe; this holds for the distinction 
between north and West European contexts compared to East and south European 
contexts, but after a closer look we also see important differences within these 
blocks. In north-west Europe, for example, the Dutch, the UK and Swedish wel-
fare states all have their own character, albeit that the UK is standing out in terms 
of their liberal regime. In terms of housing and urban intervention, this makes a 
big difference. The Norwegian institutional milieu is also particularly interesting 
as a strong democratic welfare model coincides with a market-oriented dual hous-
ing regime. Even in rather similar states, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, 
the types of interventions are different. In Sweden, for example, urban renewal is 
much less realised through demolition and replacement by building new dwellings 
374 Szymon Marcińczak et al.
than in the Netherlands. Institutional arrangements also differ between the coun-
tries mentioned because of different economic structures and differences in terms 
of how projects have been financed, how mortgage systems have been developed 
and the like. This has had evident impacts as we see that a city like Stockholm 
has hardly been hit by the recent crisis, whereas Amsterdam and the Baltic States 
clearly have experienced rather strong effects. Also within southern Europe there 
are differences. What we see is that family solidarity networks (requiring spatial 
proximity) are still very important drivers for changing levels of segregation in 
Athens and Milan but gradually less so in Madrid. In East Europe, with the excep-
tion of the Czech Republic that largely preserved the corporatist welfare regime 
and a significant public role in housing provision, the systemic transformation 
that started in the early 1990s brought about a massive privatisation of housing 
and a deep liberalisation and vanishing of social safety nets that, in turn, boosted 
the rising economic inequality.
In Figure 15.5 the index of dissimilarity of the 12 cities is plotted against 
seven welfare-state and housing regimes. Overall, it seems that the different types 
of welfare-state and housing regimes are only modestly related to the levels of 
socio-economic spatial divisions of the top and bottom social strata in European 
cities, and that the relationship has weakened (Figure 15.5). However, there is 
more structure in the data than initially expected. In the early 2000s, former socialist 
cities, even those in the most liberal contexts, were still the least segregated. 
Figure 15.5  Welfare states, housing regimes and residential segregation between top and 
bottom social groups in selected European cities.
Notes: * Metropolitan region, **city.
Madrid, Tallinn, London, Budapest, Vilnius, Athens, Prague, Riga – managers and elementary 
occupations.
Amsterdam, Oslo, Stockholm – highest and lowest income quintile.
Vienna – university degree and compulsory education.
Lessons from a pan-European comparative study 375
This may be ascribed to the forced egalitarianism that existed under the totalitar-
ian socialist regimes some decades ago. That impact changed from 1989/1991 
onwards but only with a time lag. The differences between north-west and south 
Europe are also evident, with the dual housing regime and liberal welfare state 
being the most segregated and the social-democratic welfare regime characterised 
by noticeably lower levels of segregation. One relation is particularly intriguing, 
however. There are several welfare states that are rather similar, such as the demo-
cratic welfare states in Norway and Sweden but perhaps also the Netherlands. 
Nevertheless, levels of segregation between the top and bottom of the social divi-
sion are clearly different between the capital cities of these states (Oslo versus 
Amsterdam and Stockholm) or they develop in a different direction (Amsterdam 
versus Stockholm).
Levels of socio-economic segregation vary a lot within similar housing sys-
tems. In some countries with strong public involvement in the housing sector 
(unitary housing system), we find both low levels of segregation (Prague) and 
high levels of segregation (Stockholm and Vienna). True, we do not know what 
would be the levels of socio-economic segregation in the latter two cities if no 
elaborate housing policies existed. In countries with dual housing systems, we 
find significant variation too. Tallinn and London represent high levels of seg-
regation, while Oslo represents low levels of segregation. The latter implies that 
market-based housing systems should not necessarily lead to high levels of segre-
gation, at least in the context of an otherwise generous welfare system.
Finally, various developments interfere with each other. Amsterdam, with its 
stronger position in terms of globalisation (which drives segregation up) also 
experienced more than a decade of more liberal housing market intervention (also 
driving segregation up), while after 2008 the crisis had its effects as well (freezing 
segregation patterns). In Sweden neo-liberalisation also has had its effect and cre-
ated more social spatial inequality, with higher levels of separation between top 
and bottom social categories than before. In fact, both cities have moved into a 
direction which is comparable to what we see elsewhere in more easily recognised 
liberal contexts, such as London, but also in more recent liberal environments, 
such as Madrid and the capital cities of the Baltic States. In all cases we may 
observe a positive correlation between the liberal welfare and housing regimes 
and socio-economic segregation, but the relationship between welfare regimes 
and housing systems with residential segregation is very complex and requires 
more in-depth analysis.
Conclusions and new perspectives
The comparative study of socio-economic residential segregation in European cit-
ies is almost new territory. So far, few studies have dealt with socio-economic 
segregation in a comparative research framework. This volume has the ambition 
to provide new insights related to socio-economic segregation and especially 
the factors which help to explain the levels and dynamics of segregation. In the 
theoretical framework we presented in Chapter 1, we elaborated on the potential 
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changes in European capital cities and on the impact of globalisation, economic 
restructuring, welfare regime shifts and changing social inequality in general. 
We also referred to the previously developed historical development paths and 
to potential intervening factors, such as segregation in other domains, includ-
ing ethnic/cultural and demographic domains. The introduction suggested that 
understanding social-spatial segregation in cities and/or their metropolitan areas 
is quite a challenge. Most importantly, the theory-grounded hypothesised ranking 
of European capital cities as introduced in Chapter 1 was not entirely confirmed 
by the actual patterns of socio-economic segregation. In this final section of the 
final chapter we will highlight some of the most salient findings from this volume 
and illuminate the mismatch between theory and reality.
We can draw two main conclusions from the analysis presented in this volume. 
The first is that the levels of socio-economic segregation in European capital cities 
are still rather modest. Segregation levels in cities in the Americas, Africa and parts 
of East Asia (Florida 2014; Maloutas and Fuijta 2012) are (much) higher than in 
Europe, and the negative side effects of high levels of segregation are only making 
their way into urban and political debates in Europe. However, the second main 
finding from this volume is that in the last decade Europe has been slipping, albeit 
slowly, into the epoch of growing inequalities and segregation. Under the influ-
ence of (neo-)liberal transformations in welfare states, and under the influence of 
the fact that several European cities also managed to become embedded in strong 
global networks and flows of people, the levels of socio-economic segregation are 
moving upwards. So far, this did not yet produce extreme levels of segregation in 
European cities, but Europe is clearly heading in the direction of higher levels of 
socio-economic divisions and especially in terms of the spatial separation of the 
top and bottom of social distributions. Three-quarters of the cities we included in 
this volume showed increasing levels of segregation of the top social categories, 
and a similar share showed increasing segregation of the lowest social categories. 
However, the spatial gap between the more extreme categories, those that have and 
those that have not, is widening in all capital cities across Europe. 
We found that the shape of the ‘segregation distribution’ (low versus the rest; 
middle versus the rest and high versus the rest) is generally U-shaped, with more 
segregation of the higher-social strata than of the lower-social strata also in former 
totalitarian socialist environments. However, due to the complexity of the matter, 
we cannot speak of a universal shape of the relationship between class and space. 
In two-thirds of the European capital cities we investigated, higher social classes 
still form the most segregated social category; however, the remaining cases show 
other outcomes. All in all, it is clear that segregation between the two groups 
in European cities tend to be increasing. Nevertheless, we have also shown that 
there still is quite some variation in levels of segregation. Some of that seems to 
be caused by time lags between the development of socio-economic inequality 
and segregation. This was evident in the former socialist countries in the East of 
Europe but also elsewhere. Social inequalities that have developed three or four 
decades ago still have an enormous impact on current social spatial disparities. 
Other contributions to the variation in outcomes come from temporal factors, such 
Lessons from a pan-European comparative study 377
as relatively short-term economic, financial or housing crises. These examples 
illustrate that for a fuller understanding of trends in socio-economic segrega-
tion, we would need an extended time frame on top of the ten years we used in 
this volume to fully grasp the complex relation between inequality and segrega-
tion. Finally, several contributions in this volume have discussed the relationship 
between socio-economic and ethnic segregation. In some places, neighbourhoods 
and cities, that relationship is strong, but it has also been shown that this is not 
a one-to-one relationship. In some cases social distances between social classes 
within the category non-natives were even bigger than social distances within 
the category natives. Caution is required here and researchers and policy makers 
should not automatically assume that ‘non-western’ migrants are all lower class.
Institutional arrangements – welfare-state regimes or housing regimes – may 
be developed in such a way that these can effectively temper social inequalities. 
However, welfare and housing regimes may also be designed in such a way that 
social inequalities are increased. We currently seem to have entered an era in 
which the latter type of regime has taken centre stage, with increasing segrega-
tion as a result. Currently, even a country like Sweden, which has long been the 
example par excellence for redistributing affluence and therewith was the proto-
type of a country that managed to avoid high levels of social spatial segregation, 
is showing rapidly increasing levels of segregation. Although there is no simple 
one-to-one relationship between the riots in Stockholm in the summer of 2013 
and increasing socio-spatial segregation, the riots have caused much debate on 
the direction Sweden is taking and the causes of social unrest in the most deprived 
neighbourhoods (Malmberg et al. 2013). The actual European reality is that most 
welfare regimes have become more market oriented to stimulate the economy in 
a liberal way, with increasing social inequality as a side effect.
The relationship between increasing socio-economic segregation in Europe 
and situations that are seriously threatening urban social life (such as riots) is an 
issue that does not yet seem to be fully understood. Extreme forms of segregation 
include gated communities for the top end of the socio-economic distribution, 
and inaccessible ghettos or favelas for the bottom ends of the socio-economic 
distribution. The potential estrangement that may be the result of such contrasts – 
people increasingly will be unaware of the lives of contrasting classes – might be 
dynamite under the social stability of our future cities. The increasing number of 
no-go areas in our cities implies that ultimately major parts of cities are regarded 
to be no part of urban life anymore, which implies a serious limitation of free-
dom in such cities, and are having a major impact on the lives of those living in 
these no-go areas. Social apartheid, a process involving social discrimination and 
manifested in very high inequalities and spatial separation of the rich and the poor 
(Löwy 2003), could be the ultimate outcome of these urban social processes.
The explanatory framework for urban socio-economic segregation is highly 
complicated because of the many different dimensions simultaneously playing 
a role and over a longer period of time. One explanatory factor is not enough to 
illuminate the changing levels of segregation in Europe. In general, a liberal 
(market-oriented) institutional environment and higher levels of social inequality 
378 Szymon Marcińczak et al.
result in more separated spatial divisions. But less market does not necessarily entail 
lower levels of segregation (see Oslo versus Stockholm). Globalisation seems to 
be a relatively strong indicator of segregation, as long as we are satisfied with the 
general conclusion that Alpha cities (cities which link major economic regions 
and states to the world economy) are more segregated than other types of cities. 
Yet other factors may enhance or mitigate such a relation. A further explanatory 
factor of socio-economic segregation to consider is ‘space’ and inherited urban 
physical fabric. Some areas retain their attraction for certain niche groups over a 
long period of time, although a new valuation of spaces also may occur. Inner-city 
neighbourhoods that were regarded as not being attractive in the 1970s and 1980s 
have been gentrified by middle-class households that settled in originally blue-
collar neighbourhoods. On the other hand, some neighbourhoods, large estates of 
mass-produced blocks of flats in particular, have been steadily losing middle-class 
residents. Put differently, the social and physical upgrading of neighbourhoods, as 
well as the reverse trend of social and spatial decay of neighbourhoods, plays an 
important role in shaping new social geographies of segregation.
To conclude, we have found that levels of socio-spatial segregation in Europe 
are still relatively modest compared to the rest of the world, but that they are 
increasing. We found that four central indicators of the multi-factor approach – 
welfare and housing regime, globalisation and economic restructuring, rising 
social inequality and historical development paths – all play a big role in chang-
ing the social urban landscape in Europe. It is also clear that understanding local 
institutional, social and physical contexts are crucial for a better understanding of 
changing social segregation patterns. These factors are, however, not stable over 
time, since contexts are changing continuously, through the enlargement of the 
European Union, neo-liberalization of states, immigration, economic crises and 
urban transformations. The ultimate lesson of this book is that a combination of 
both structural factors and a context-sensitive approach is needed to fully under-
stand the socio-economic segregation processes to allow policy-makers to counter 
the negative effects that endanger the stability of European cities.
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Notes
1 We use the term East Europe for countries that used to be part of the state-socialist 
centrally planned countries for the five decades after World War II (Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania in this book), and West Europe to the rest of 
Europe (Austria, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
in this book).
2 The shape of segregation curves in Athens might also be the result of the heterogeneous 
composition of occupations included in the group of ‘managers and higher representatives’. 
The group in Athens also includes middle and even low middle income categories.
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